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ABSTRACT1 
Ubiquitous computing is leading to ubiquitous sensing. Sensor components such as motion, 
proximity, and biometric sensors are increasingly common features in everyday objects. However, the 
presence and full capabilities of these components are often not clear to users. Sensor-enhanced 
objects have the ability to perceive without being perceived. This reduces the ability of users to 
control how and when they are being sensed. To address this imbalance, this project identifies the 
need to be able to deceive ‘smart’ objects, and proposes a number of practical interventions to 
increase user awareness of sensors, and encourage agency over digital sensing through acts of 
dishonesty to objects. 
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 1 CONTEXT 
Sensor components are found in increasing quantity across a broad range of common ‘smart’ devices, 
such as phones, wearables, and domestic appliances. The commercial growth of this type of product 
means that what in the past may have been regarded as ‘dumb’ objects, such as door handles [29], 
shoes [2], or toasters [11], now have the potential to perceive and communicate. 
 
Whatever the ultimate utility of these products, the increased presence of sensors in everyday objects 
raises issues of agency, privacy and consent for users, and provokes a re-evaluation of the relationship 
between people and the objects that surround them.  
 
Unlike manual input mechanisms, sensors do not require attentive and deliberate use of an interface, 
but can instead actively and persistently observe physical attributes of a user or environment. The 
result of this is that users may not always be aware of the extent of their interaction with an object or 
the digital system it represents. 
 
As events such as the Facebook Cambridge Analytica breech [8] make the users of online digital 
systems increasingly aware of issues relating to the data they are generating and sharing, there is a 
risk that physical sensor technology represents something of a blind spot. Online interfaces already 
offer some accessible tools to enable users to control or manipulate the information shared with 
online systems, for example “Incognito Mode” [10] and Ad Blockers for web browsers [1], or 
consumer-level VPN (Virtual Private Network) services. However, there is a lack of equivalent 
functionality for object-based systems. Whilst the motivations for lying as a privacy-protective 
behaviour [24] might be similar in virtual and physical environments, the means of deception are 
significantly different. 
 
2  LYING TO OBJECTS 
 
2.1  Technical dishonesty 
Browser-based privacy tools such as those mentioned above represent a form of low-level, semi-
sanctioned deception of online systems by users. Their availability indicates two important qualities 
amongst users: awareness and agency. The fact that there is popular demand for browser features 
that limit or obscure online activities demonstrates that users have an awareness that their 
behaviours are potentially subject to observations outside of their immediate context. Mindful of this, 
they seek access to tools which give them a degree of agency over the observations being made. This 
agency takes the form of a wilful non-compliance – rejecting the expected information exchanges. 
These acts of technical dishonesty allow the user to regain some control over their information. 
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Figure 1: I Spy Sensors, cover page. A guidebook to 
sensors that forms the first part of the 
Countermeasures project. © Angus Main 
 
 
 
 
 
This project aims to take the prerequisite conditions of that dishonesty – awareness followed by 
agency – and apply it to interactions with physical objects.  
 
2.2  Awareness 
Definitions of lying [17] presuppose a second party - an observer of the falsehood, or an intended 
target of the deception. It’s impossible, theoretically, to lie in isolation. To consider lying to an object 
first requires an acknowledgement of the object as a potential interlocutor - that it has the capacity 
to receive and attend to information. A primary aim of the Countermeasures project is to provoke 
this acknowledgement amongst users. 
 
In the context of contemporary private and public space, regarding surrounding objects as perceptive 
to information is both plausible and constructive. The combination of physical sensors and wireless 
connectivity in smart devices and ‘internet of things’ products [4] means that environments are 
increasingly likely to contain objects that are active observers of human behaviour. Sensors transduce 
physical actions into digital information, and connectivity allows this information to be perceived and 
considered by a broader range of remote systems. Together, the physical sensors and networked 
analysis form an extended digital sensorium attuned to human behaviour. While the inferences of the 
algorithmic parts of this sensorium are noted for their inscrutability, the practical sensing apparatus 
are also difficult to comprehend, despite their physical presence. 
 
Acknowledging the intermediary role of sensor-enhanced objects encourages us to understand them 
in a different context. Such objects are not passive, but are active agents of observation for systems 
reliant on an incoming flow of information. The inclusion of sensors turns televisions into observing, 
rather than merely observed objects [22], central heating thermostats observe domestic behaviours 
on behalf of global technology firms [15], and sensor enhanced cars act as vigilant representatives of 
insurance companies [5]. Whether we are aware of it or not, sensor-enhanced objects of this sort 
receive information from us, and in doing so have the capacity to be lied to. 
 
Beyond the fundamental awareness that objects could be the target of a lie, successful lying also 
requires some awareness of the nature of the recipient of the false information. To convince someone 
that something false is true requires a certain level of understanding of their nature [23]. How much 
do they already know? What are their motivations? What are they likely to believe or 
disbelieve?  These are also pertinent questions to ask about sensor-enhanced objects. The hidden 
nature of sensors - often taking the form of miniature integrated circuits buried within the exterior 
housing of devices - means that users do not necessarily know much about their presence or 
capabilities. Without access to live data generated by these sensors it’s difficult to understand what 
behaviours they are sensitive to, and the extent or limitations of their perceptive abilities. 
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Figure 2 and 3: Sample pages from the I Spy 
Sensors book. These pages give a description of 
sensors found in specific objects and guide to their 
functionality.   
© Angus Main 
 
The visible functionality of the object itself may only provide incomplete information about the 
nature of the sensing. For example, while a user may understand from using the interface that a 
smartphone contains a sensor that knows when it is being shaken back and forth, they are unlikely to 
know that the same sensor is so sensitive to vibration that it can act as a serviceable microphone [21]. 
Educating users to the presence and capabilities of these sensors is another core aim of this project. 
 
The final area of awareness that the project seeks to encourage relates to the nature of the 
information itself. A conscious lie is the deliberate statement of false information. Logically, knowing 
what is false requires a liar to have an understanding of what represents a true statement. What is 
the ‘true’ information we currently already share with the sensor-enhanced objects that surround us? 
What data do we already allow to be generated about us, and how accurately does this reflect our 
behaviours? How might the existing information created by our actions be altered or subverted? 
 
2.3   Agency 
The use of hidden sensors in objects creates a power imbalance between the user and the 
manufacturer or service provider. It is a clear, contemporary example of the panopticon effect 
described by Bentham and Foucault [9].  As Foucault says of the hypothetical inmate of an 
architectural panopticon, “he is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never 
a subject in communication” [9]. Similarly, the user of sensor-enhanced objects is engaged in 
constant communication, but without complete control over the nature of their contribution. 
 
In the type of unilateral ‘visibility trap’ described by Foucault, the ability to lie represents a crucial 
degree of agency. It implies control over the flow of information from transmitter to receiver, and 
elevates the observed to an active subject in the communication. 
 
Of the myriad different forms of lying and deception defined in law and linguistics, this project 
identifies three different categories which are applicable to lying to objects: falsification, omission, 
and obfuscation. Between them these three types of lie encompass the whole gamut of dishonesty, 
each undermining a separate tenet of society’s model of truth - the oath of sworn testimony “to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth”. 
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2.4   Omission - Telling the truth, but not the whole truth 
Starting with the simplest to implement in the context of smart objects, to lie by omission is the 
selective exclusion of information to create a deceptive impression of events. Controlling the flow of 
information to include favourable data and omit unfavourable data is often achievable by simply 
blocking or obscuring the sensors on objects. For example, putting tape over a camera, motion sensor 
or microphone, or leaving the object in a different room, cupboard or refrigerator [7]. This is a blunt 
approach, but one that is already commonly used to manually disable webcams for privacy reasons 
[19] [6] [16]. 
 
There are several benefits to this approach. It’s simple to achieve with minimal resources. It 
potentially reduces the information shared through a particular sensor to zero, making any kind of 
analysis or inference difficult. The manual nature of the intervention also provides the user with  
reassuringly physical evidence of the ongoing deception – i.e. ‘if I can’t see the camera lens through 
the tape, it can’t see me’. 
 
Deception by simple omission also has clear drawbacks. The ‘believability’ of the lie is limited as the 
deception is easily detectable. Sustained loss or reduction of signal within a system can be recognised 
and programmed for. Furthermore, as information is only being selectively withheld rather than 
actively fabricated, the user has only limited agency over information they are communicating with 
objects. Finally, as a method of deception this approach is only really viable for objects where a 
sensor is visible and accessible on the surface, such as a camera or microphone. It is less useful for 
sensors which operate obscured within an object, for example gyroscopes, accelerometers or 
barometers. For these types of sensors obfuscation may be a more successful form of lying. 
 
2.5   Obfuscation - Telling the truth, and everything but the truth 
Sworn testimony seeks ‘nothing but the truth’ as clarity is an imperative to truth. Conversely 
confusion is a useful vehicle for deception. True information can be lost, and deceptions created, if the 
truth is accompanied by a barrage of falsity. In informational terms adding random or unnecessary 
data to the communication increases entropy and makes it harder to determine signal from noise. 
Obfuscation is an approach already used in programming to prevent code from being read and 
understood by third parties by disrupting the flow of computation and artificially extending the 
content of the code [3] [18]. A similar approach can be taken to the disorientation of sensor-
enhanced objects by deliberately targeting the sensors with excessive stimulus in order to obscure 
true readings in a stream of meaningless ones. For example, an accelerometer subjected to focused, 
persistent vibration from something like a haptic motor, is less likely to be able to detect any 
nuanced, natural movements of the object. 
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 While this form of deception offers an opportunity to target embedded or less accessible sensors, and 
is potentially less detectable, it does require a more technical understanding of the sensors used in an 
object and the conditions required to activate them. Also, although it allows for more controlled 
deception than methods of omission, it still doesn’t allow the user full control over the information 
they are communicating. For that the falsification approach is required. 
 
2.6   Falsification - Telling your version of the truth 
While omission and obfuscation allow for some information agency though deception, to achieve 
further control users would need the ability to manipulate sensors to generate specific information of  
their choosing. This would allow not just general deception, but outright lies - fabrications of specific 
untruths. Falsifying the information perceived by a sensor-enhanced object can be achieved in a 
number of ways, dependent on the nature of the sensor. A simple example would be using a strong 
magnet to affect a magnetometer and simulate a specific compass heading. More sophisticated 
sensors require more complex methods of falsification, for example spoofing a particular geolocation 
by falsifying a GPS signal [14]. This level of deception is more complex in terms of its application, 
requiring specific hardware and technical knowledge, but also more complex in terms of its impact. 
For example, successful falsification such as GPS spoofing can be undetectable by the object itself, 
and could have significant and undesirable consequences [14]. 
 
2.7   Moral Considerations 
This project advocates lying and deception within the context of sensor-enhanced objects, and it 
would therefore be incomplete without consideration of the moral implications of these actions. The 
inherent immorality of lying can be taken for granted in many different contexts. However, the 
specific provocation for the deceptions described here is the inequity of power that sensors create by 
perceiving without being perceived. A usual requirement of lying in verbal or written forms is that a 
person makes a statement or declaration. In the normal use of a sensor enhanced object, no distinct 
‘statement’ exists. Without the ability to directly control the sensors, all observable actions are 
potentially statements of information. This intrusive level of attention can be seen as a contravention 
of the normal expectations of communication, to which the deceptions described here are a 
countermeasure. The question to ask is whether these objects have ‘a right to truth’ [17], or whether 
this is negated by their nature. 
 
Whilst users remain unaware of the full perceptive activities of the objects that surround them, then 
the process of deception is arguably started by the object itself. This is even before we consider 
sensor-enhanced objects which are specifically designed to lie to people, as demonstrated with the 
VW emissions scandal [12]. 
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Figure 4 and 5: A microphone disabler. The left 
image shows the headphone jack without its case 
and the 1.5K Ohm resistor visible. The right image 
shows the device with 3D printed case attached, 
plugged into an iPhone 8 using the native 
lightning connector adapter. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The waveform of two 15 second sound 
recording. The top waveform is a recording of 
ambient sound using an iPhone 8. The bottom 
waveform is a recording of the same sound on the 
same phone, but with the microphone disabler 
attached. 
 
 
 
3  OUTCOME 
To facilitate both awareness of and agency over sensor-enhanced objects, this project presents a 
range of design outcomes which aim to educate the users of these objects, and provide them with the 
means to create object-based deceptions. Awareness will be promoted through a custom designed 
guidebook to sensors, and agency through a toolkit of deception mechanisms. 
 
The project deliberately focuses on physical means of deception rather than software-based solutions. 
The intention of this is to demonstrably place control back in the hands of the user by keeping the  
tools in their realm of experience, rather than in the domain of the digital object. As Snowden and 
Huang note in the description of their physical counter-surveillance tool for phones [25], digital 
devices are open to hidden compromises and yet there are “no tools available through which one can 
determine what is happening beneath the glass and icons, preventing the development of a natural 
understanding of dangerous device states”. By using analogue tools there is the possibility that the 
physical affordances of the objects can reinforce awareness and agency, such as with the tape over a 
camera.  
 
3.1  The Guidebook 
Taking inspiration from children’s travel books and spotting guides such as Michelin’s I-Spy series of 
car journey activity books [13], the guidebook will present readers with a simple guide to recognising 
the presence of sensors in everyday situations and understanding more about their capabilities (fig. 
1). In simulating the tone of familiar children’s books the aim is to present the information about 
complex technology in a non-technical, nostalgic, and accessible manner. 
 
Following the format of such guides, the book presents images of the sensor-enhanced objects as 
they appear in the environment, and then further information about their capabilities, and how they 
could be deceived (fig. 2 and 3). 
 
The guide book is intended as a form of critical design, inviting the reader to consider and question 
the proliferation of sensors in everyday objects, as well as offering a means of intervention. It covers a 
range of domestic and public spaces such as the kitchen, the living room, and the high street, as well  
as specific devices such as smart phones. Although the information contained in the guidebook could 
also be disseminated in a number of other forms, such as website or app, a print book has been 
chosen in order to aid distribution to non-technical audiences and underscore the projects emphasis 
on the physical. 
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Figure 7 and 8: Two images of the Phone Jig. The 
laser cut cardboard device is easily assembled and 
allows the user to create repetitive physical actions 
to simulate behaviours like walking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2   The liars tool bag 
The tool bag consists of range of low-cost tools and materials to assist the deception of sensor-
enhanced objects. The format and design of the tools is open source and could be replicated by  
individuals or organisation wishing to create their own versions. The inventory of included tools can 
be customised to suit particular contexts, but primarily includes tools for deceiving the sensors on 
smartphones. This is because smartphones represent the most common and most abundant source of 
sensors in daily life, and are therefore useful test beds for deception. The tools that can be included in 
the tool bag are: 
 
Magnets, for falsifying magnetometer or compass data. This has been tested on iPhones using small 
Neodymium N42 magnets rated at a 2.7kg pull. A magnet in a stable position close to the phone 
causes the software compass to lock to a constant incorrect position (falsification). Moving the 
magnet around effectively disorientates the compass and prompts the software to request the user 
recalibrates (obfuscation). 
Paper templates, for identifying the position of sensors within common smartphones. These are cut 
out paper sheets which can be placed directly on the back of the phone and indicate the location of 
specific sensors. Used in combination with the guide book and some of the other tools in the tool bag, 
this allows users to deceive particular sensors on their phone. Information is compiled from 
“teardown” analysis of devices. [27] [28]. 
Stickers, for covering cameras, infrared motions sensors, and microphones. These are simple, 
removable stickers which can be used in conjunction with the guide book. 
Microphone disablers, a headphone jack with a 1.5k Ohm resistor attached to mimic the 
impedance of an external microphone, and cause the operating system to disable the internal 
microphones on digital devices (fig. 4 and 5). As the jack and resistor have no ability to sense sound, 
this effectively leaves the device listening to nothing. These disabling devices are low-cost and 
effective (fig. 6). However, they do rely on the devices software, and are therefore not a purely 
physical method of deception. 
Phone jig, a cardboard actuator for a smartphone which physically moves the device in order to 
activate the accelerometer (fig. 7 and 8)). The principle of this is similar to existing critical design 
projects such as Studio NAND [26] and Unfit-bits [20], but in this case designed to produce specific 
deceptions using simple materials -  corrugated cardboard, rubber bands, wooden sticks and a pencil. 
The jig comes with various sized cams which can be configured to move the articulated phone holder 
in various different ways. Users can create their own cams to simulate particular movements. 
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Figure 9: An iPhone inside a sealable plastic bag. 
This allows the user to control the air pressure 
around the phone. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: A graph showing the relative altitude 
readings from an iPhone 8’s barometer sensor over 
a 30 second period. The phone had been sealed in a 
plastic bag with an air pocket inside. After 10 
seconds, gentle pressure is applied to the sealed 
bag, resulting in dramatic change in altitude 
readings. 
 
Sealable plastic bags, for controlling the air pressure in a smartphone and manipulating the 
barometric sensor. The plastic bag is a standard freezer bag, large enough to contain a phone (fig. 9). 
Sealing the phone inside allows the user to control the air pressure, which in turn is used to help 
calculate altitude. Sealing the phone in the bag with a large pocket of air, and then pressing gently on 
the bag causes the pressure to rise artificially. (fig. 10). The bag also provides a convenient container 
for the tools.  
 
3.3   Conclusion 
The guidebook and tool bag provide a starting point for creating awareness and agency over sensor-
enhanced objects.  They demonstrate that it’s possible to counteract sensor components using simple 
physical tools.  
The outcomes are not intended as conclusive solution, but a provocation, and a foundation for further 
activities. As sensor technology advances and becomes more pervasive, further countermeasures will 
be required. By disseminating these tools and concepts amongst the HCI community and broader 
user groups, the intention is that the project may gain further contributors and partners. It’s 
important to acknowledge the limitations of such approaches – not all device users will be able to 
afford to use tools for deception and subversion, no matter the financial cost of the materials. 
However, it is hoped that the dialogue they provoke may extend further than just the physical 
outcomes, and that by framing these activities as lying, an implicit ethical question is raised which 
could prompt new approaches to our interactions with smart objects.  
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